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"SPECIFIC PORTION" TRUSTS
AND THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States' dealt with a trust under which the surviving spouse was given
the right to income of $300 per month and the power to appoint the
entire corpus at her death. On the federal estate tax return the executor
claimed the full value of the trust corpus qualified for the marital deduc-
tion. The Commissioner denied the deduction because the right of the
surviving spouse to income was not expressed as a right to income from
a "fractional or percentile" share of the trust.2 The tax imposed was
paid and suit for refund instituted in the District Court. The district
court allowed the deduction, 3 the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 4
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of con-
flict among the circuits.5
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the Treasury Regulation
requiring that a "specific portion" of a trust from which a surviving
spouse is to receive income be expressed as a fraction or percent of
the whole trust6 was contrary to the intent of Congress and, therefore,
invalid "in the context of this case."'7 Three dissenting justices contended
that the majority did not give proper weight to the legislative history
of the marital deduction or to the prior case law dealing with this de-
duction.
II. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In an attempt to provide geographic equality in estate tax treatment
among common law and community property states,8 Congress, in 1948,
enacted marital deduction provisions9 which are substantially the same
as those currently in effect. Essentially, up to one-half of the adjusted
1387 U.S. 213 (1967).
2See Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
3 235 F.Supp. 941 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
4 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
5 387 U.S. 213, 217 (1967).
6 Treasury Regulations §20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958). The relevant part of the Reg-
ulation is as follows:(c) Definition of "specific portion." A partial interest in property is
not treated as a specific portion of the entire interest unless the rights
of the surviving spouse in income and as to the power constitute a frac-
tional or percentile share of a property interest so that such interest or
share in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionate share of the incre-
ment or decline in the whole of the property interest to -which the income
rights and the power relate. Thus, if the right of the spouse to income
and the power extend to one-half or a specified percentage of the prop-
erty, or the equivalent, the interest is considered as a specific portion.
On the other hand, if the annual income of the spouse is limited to a
specific sum, or if she has a power to appoint only a specific sum out of
a larger fund, the interest is not a deductible interest.
7 387 U.S. 213, 218 (1967).
8 See S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), 1948-1 C. B. 260.
9 Ch. 168, §361, 62 Stat. 117, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, §812, 53
Stat. 123.
1968]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
gross estate could be deducted-could pass tax free from the decedent's
estate-if it was given to the surviving spouse. 10 A terminable interest
passing to the surviving spouse did not generally qualify for the marital
deduction.
However, exceptions to the terminable interest rule recognized some
of the common methods of testamentary distribution." A trust was a!-
lowed, for example, if the spouse had an unconditional right to the
entire income for life and the unrestricted power to appoint the entire
corpus, either during life or at her death.12 In discussing this exception
to the terminable interest rule, the Senate Report used the phrase
"virtual owner," which has precipitated much discussion.
The provisions of subparagraph (F) of section 812(e) (1)
under the bill as it passed the House have been expanded in your
committee bill. These provisions have the effect of allowing a
marital deduction with respect to the value of property trans-
ferred in trust by or at the direction of the decedent where the
surviving spouse, by reason of her right to the income and a
power of appointment, is the virtual owner of the property. This
provision is designed to allow the marital deduction for such
cases where the value of the property over which the surviving
spouse has a power of appointment will (if not consumed) be
subject to either the estate tax or the gift tax in the case of such
surviving spouse.
13
The 1948 requirements that the spouse have entire income and power
to appoint the entire corpus in effect required the use of two trusts if
the testator wished to provide for other beneficiaries by the mechanism
of a trust. If the entire estate was given in one trust, and the widow
was given income from, and power to appoint, part of the trust while
the children were given similar interests in the balance, no part of the
trust qualified for the marital deduction. Clearly, however, if the testator
had specified the creation of two trusts, for exactly the same purposes,
the marital deduction would have been available as to the trust for the
spouse.
Congress removed this two-trust obstacle with the 1954 amendments
to the marital deduction provisions. 14 A trust is now allowed to qualify
for a marital deduction, as an exception to the terminable interest dis-
qualification, when the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income
from the whole trust or from a "specific portion" of the trust, and has
the power to appoint the whole corpus or a "specific portion" thereof. 15
This does not require that the right to income and the power to appoint
relate to the same amount of corpus; if the interests are not identical,
1o S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), 1948-1 C.B. 305.
11 S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), 1948-1 C.B. 341.
' Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §361(e) (1) (F), 62 Stat. 118.
13 S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), 1948-1 C.B. 342.
14 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d. Sess., 125 (1954).
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056(b) (5).
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the marital deduction is available to the extent of the smaller interest
which is the "specific portion."' 6
The key phrase in the 1954 provision is clearly "specific portion,"
which is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code. The legislative his-
tory, however, did use a fraction to illustrate an application of the new
provision.:" The Treasury Regulation subsequently defining the term, 8
required that the specific portion be a "fractional or percentile share
of a property interest." The Regulations further declared a benefit ex-
pressed as a specific sum (of either income or corpus) did not satisfy
the marital deduction requirements for a "specific portion."
The validity of the Regulation requiring the use of a fraction or
percent was challenged in several instances. The courts were of con-
flicting opinion as to whether the Regulation was consistent with the
intent of Congress. The Second 9 and Seventh Circuits ° concluded that
the Regulation was not an accurate interpretation of congressional intent
and declared it invalid as unduly restrictive. These Circuits concluded,
basically, that the term "specific portion" could apply to a gift of a fixed
amount of income. They further concluded that the total amount in-
volved could be computed and the "specific portion" thus determined.
These courts both adopted two important arguments. First, they argued
that Congress would have used the phrase "fraction or percent" if
that was what was intended; but since the term "specific portion" was
used and was clearly susceptible to broader interpretations, the limitation
of the Regulations was not justified.21 Secondly, the courts observed that
the use of actuarial computation is common in many other similar tax
situations; consequently, it is hardly something that could be termed
a judicial innovation. 22 The individual cases which might arise in which
the government would lose taxes because of the assumptions inherent
in such computation would be off-set in other cases by the opposite re-
sult.23
The court,'24 which in effect upheld the Treasury Regulations defin-
16See Treas. Regs. §20.2056(b)-5(b) (1958) and Gelb v. Commissioner, 298
F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1962).
'1 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 474 (1954). The relevant language
from the Senate Report is the following:
For example, if the decedent in his will provided for the creation
of a trust under the terms of which the income from all or one-half of
the trust property is payable to this surviving spouse with uncontrolled
power in the spouse to appoint all or such one-half of the trust property
by will, such interest will qualify as an exception from the terminable
interest rule.is Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b) -5(c) (1958).
19 Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
20 Citizens Nat'l. Bank of Evansville v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.
1966).
21298 F.2d 544, 550-551 (2d Cir. 1962); 359 F.2d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 1966).
22298 F.2d 544, 551-552 (2d Cir. 1962); 359 F.2d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 1966).
23298 F.2d 544, 552 (2d Cir. 1962).
24 Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d
476 (3d Cir. 1966).
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ition of "specific portion," relied heavily upon the general history of the
marital deduction. The beginning premise is that the basic intent was
to equalize estate tax treatment in community property and common law
states. Since the spouse in a community property state was outright
owner of one-half of the estate, such spouse bore the risk of appreciation
in value of the estate and of the greater taxes which would result at such
spouse's death. Thus, it was reasoned, the spouse in common law prop-
erty states must receive an interest subject to similar risks.2 5
This is the point the dissent in Northeastern.26 is making. The dis-
sent suggests that the majority had misunderstood the use of the phrase
"virtual owner" in the original marital deduction legislative history.2 7
As the dissent reads the Senate Report, there is implicit in the term
and the context, a concept of the surviving spouse acquiring an interest
which will be subject to estate tax on an amount to be determined at
the date of death of the surviving spouse. 28 This conclusion is not illogi-
cal. However, the point of the majority opinion in Northeastern still
stands ;29 there is no express reference by Congress to the requirement
(set forth in Regulations only) that the surviving spouse share with
the government the risk of appreciation in value of the corpus.
To support the logic of its conclusion, the dissent refers to United
States v. StapfY° Stapf, the dissent contends, 31 supports the reasoning
that a marital deduction should not be available when the spouse is not
the "virtual owner" of the property-when such spouse does not share
the risk of appreciation in value of the property and the result is a
tax free transfer of wealth to a succeeding generation.
It is interesting to note that the majority in Northeastern also re-
ferred to United States v. Stapf as providing a discussion of the legisla-
tive history and purpose of the marital deduction provisibns.32 The
fact situation in Stapf is considerably different than the facts presented
in Northeastern.
In Stapf, 33 the testator required his wife to relinquish her community
property and allow his will to govern its disposition as a condition to her
taking under the will. The widow did relinquish her community property
which then passed to their children. The widow then received one-third
of both the separate and community property of the decedent. However,
since the marital deduction must be determined by the net economic
25d at 482.26Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S.
213 (1967).
27 Id. at 228-229.
2s Ibid.
29 Id. at 222.
30375 U.S. 118 (1963).
31387 U.S. 213, 228 (1967).2 Id. at 219.
_9 United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
[Vol. 51
COMMENTS
interest passing to the spouse,34 and because the widow in fact gave up
more than she received, no marital deduction was allowed.
Concededly Stapf contains strong language to the effect that the
marital deduction provisions are not intended to effect tax free transfers
to succeeding generations. 35 It is not necessarily inconsistent, however,
for the majority in Northeastern to rely on this case, contrary to the
suggestion of the dissent. The widow in Northeastern had the power to
appoint the entire corpus; consequently, a tax free transfer of wealth
to her children could not occur. Thus, even if the dissent is correct, and
the legislative history precludes interpretation which would allow tax
free transfers to succeeding generations, the issue is not raised by the
facts before the court in Northeastern.
Taking a broader view of the risk of appreciation in value of the
corpus, the most that can be said is that the legislative history is incon-
clusive. There is no language which unequivocally supports either the
position of the majority or that of the dissent. The very lack of clear
statements on this question may be a valid reason to limit the holding
in Northeastern to its specific facts. This, of course, suggests that there
may be difficulties in determining the extent to which the Regulation in
question in Northeastern was in fact invalidated. It is possible that the
power to appoint a "specific portion" of a trust corpus must still contain
the risk of appreciation in the value of the whole.
If the majority in Northeastern is implying that a power to appoint
a "specific portion" of the corpus may now be expressed as a power to
appoint a sum certain, then the tax inequality feared by the dissent will
exist. As the dissent points out,36 under this interpretation of "specific
portion," the surviving spouse could be given the power to appoint
$100,000, and the value of this portion of corpus could increase from
$100,000 at the death of the creator of the trust to $300,000 at the death
of the spouse. In that case, $200,000 would pass tax free at the death
of the spouse.
The dissent argues that this result is contrary to both congressional
intent and judicial interpretation. They suggest that the concept of
"virtual owner" really is meant to include the assumption of risk of ap-
preciation in the value of the corpus to which the power of appointment
relates. Under such an interpretation, tax free transfers would not be
possible. The dissenters apparently feel, however, that such construction
was not adopted by the majority as the importance of the phrase "vir-
tual owner" was dismissed somewhat summarily.
The majority in Northeastern refers frequently to Gelb v. Commis-
sioner.37 The case is cited to the effect that Congress did not express
34 Id. at 129.
35 Id. at 128.
36 Id. at 227-228.
37 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962). The question presented in the Gelb case was
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an intent that a surviving spouse must share the fluctuations of economic
performance of the corpus in the same manner as the virtual owner to
be entitled to a marital deduction. 38 The court, however, also makes it
clear that it is not deciding the situation of Gelb,' 9 which could be in-
terpreted as a case involving a power of appointment over a specific por-
tion of corpus.
III. THE VALUATION PROBLEM
Once it is determined that the marital deduction provisions at least
do not require a "specific portion" income interest to be expressed as a
fraction or percent, there is a problem in determining how to compute
the amount of the corpus to which the deduction applies. It is clear that
the annuity value of the surviving spouse's right to particular amounts
of income will not be considered the marital deduction "specific por-
tion."" ° An annuity valuation is, of course, a calculation which considers
the actuarial life expectancy of the beneficiary; consequently, the value
relates to future rights. This, as the Court pointed out, is not a proper
consideration when determining a marital deduction. 41
Although allowing a right to a set amount of income to qualify as a
"specific portion" of the trust corpus, the Court in Northeastern did not
say exactly how that portion should be computed. Two alternative
methods appear to be available.
The language of the Court suggests that a proper computation may
be based on the projection of the reasonable rate of return of the entire
trust corpus. 42 The income reasonably expected from the entire corpus
is then computed and set in a ratio to the stipend required to be paid.
This ratio is equivalent to the ratio between the unknown specific portion
and the entire corpus. The unknown "specific portion" can be computed
algebraically as follow:
whether the interest of another in a trust could be 'carved out' and the balance
applied to the marital deduction. The testator gave the widow all the income
from the trust, and the power to invade the corpus if the income was less
than $833 a month or $10,000 a year. She also had the power to appoint the
corpus by will. The difficulty arose, however, because of a direction for the
trustees to provide for the maintenance, education and upbringing of the
youngest daughter of the testator by expending not more than $5,000 annually
for that purpose. The Court of Appeals determined that the amount available
for the benefit of the daughter could be computed actuarially and deducted
from the total trust in order to determine the "specific portion" available for
the marital deduction.
3s Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S.
213, 222 (1967).
39 Id. at 225.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Id. at 223, 224. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals referred to this ratio as
involving the maximum income which the corpus could produce. The Supreme
Court has substituted "reasonable rate of return" for "maximum income" but
otherwise appears to approve this method of calculation.
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1. Rate of return X Total corpus =Total Income
2. Specific portion ---Stipend
Total corpus Total income
3. Specific portion ==Stipend X (Total corpus)
Total income
This method of computation, however, may be subject to several
difficulties. In a footnote, 43 the Court suggests that agreement on a rea-
sonable rate of return depends upon, and requires, "reasonable invest-
ment conditions." The Court further suggests that such conditions may
not exist when there are specific restrictions on the power of the trustee
to invest. Consequently, a testamentary trust which is designed to keep
certain property in the family, such as stock in a closely held corporation,
might be precluded from a marital deduction as a "specific portion."
Another method of computation of the "specific portion" which may
be inferred from the language of the Court is somewhat simpler than
the above.44 First, a reasonable rate of return is decided upon; this ap-
parently is a rate reasonably to be expected from trust investments
generally, and would not involve the particular property in the particular
trust in question. Knowing the rate of return, and the stipend to be pro-
duced, the amount necessary to produce the stipend can be computed.
This amount is then the "specific portion" to which the marital deduction
applies. 45
1. (Specific portion) X (Rate of return) = Stipend
2. Specific portion = Stipend
Rate of return
At the writing of this article, there were no Treasury Regulations
which expressly accept or reject either method of computation. How-
ever, there is a decision from the Seventh Circuit which in fact computed
the "specific portion" by the latter method suggested by the Northeastern
case.
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. United States46 involved a trust
under which the widow was entitled to $200.00 per month up to a
specific date and $300.00 per month thereafter for life. She also had
43 Id. at 224.
44 The language from which this method of computation is inferred is the follow-
ing:
It should not be a difficult matter to settle on a rate of return avail-
able to a trustee under reasonable investment conditions, which could
be used to compute the "specific portion" of the corpus whose income
is equal to the monthly stipend provided for in the trust.
Id. at 224.
45 These computations are, of course, subject to a maximum value of one-half
the adjusted gross estate of the decedent which is allowable as a marital de-
duction.
46 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966).
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the power to appoint the entire corpus by will. There were no other
trust beneficiaries. The District Director disallowed the marital deduc-
tion for the trust on the grounds that the specific portion was not
expressed as a fraction or percentile share. The District Court, however,
held in favor of the executor and allowed a deduction. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.47
A deduction of $68,572.00 was allowed. Although both the district
and circuit courts seemed to imply that this was an actuarial computa-
tion,4 8 and referred to Treasury Regulations 49 dealing with the valuation
of life estates, remainders and reversions which include life expectancy
factors, the computation did not in fact consider the life expectancy of
the widow. The court states that the dollar amount ($68,572.00) is the
sum which is necessary, at 3 %% interest to produce income of $200.00
per month.5" The value of the entire corpus is not mentioned. At no
time is the life expectancy of the widow mentioned (or included in the
calculations apparently) although the court describes the computation
as "actuarial." The use of this term, and the reference to the Treasury
Regulations, suggests that only the rate of return was determined by
reference to these Regulations. Consequently, at least in the Seventh
Circuit, there would seem to be good reason to adopt this latter method
of computation of specific portion when a set amount of income is
provided.
A problem presented by either method of computation suggested by
Northeastern is ascertaining the "reasonable rate of return." A stipula-
tion between the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service would
doubtless cause no problems from a tax view. If a Treasury Regulation
is issued establishing rates to be used, there would at least be a uniform
starting point for those dealing with estates and trusts. However, such
a Regulation would not necessarily be conclusive as to the rate to be used.
The only place in the Regulations 1 where rates of return are pro-
jected is in the annuity tables used to compute life estates, remainder
values, and reversionary interests. Such rates have on occasion, been
successfully challenged 52 by both the government and the taxpayer as
471d. at 818.
4SId. at 819.
49Treas. Reg. §20.2031-7, 8, 26; C.F.R. §20.2031-7, 8 (1961).
50 Application of the figures stated in the opinion in the Evansville case, to the
formula suggested by the Northeastern case, illustrate how the computation
was, in fact, made.
Northeastern formula:
(Specific portion) x (rate of return) = (stipend)
Evansville calculations:
(Specific portion) x (.035) = ($2,400.00)
(Specific portion) = ($2,400.00)
(035)
Specific portion = 68,572.00
51 Treas. Reg. §20.2031-7 (1961).
52 Estate of Milton Sills, 35 B.T.A. 815 (1937) ; Havley v. United States, 63
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inaccurate under the particular circumstances. By analogy, then, a rate
for specific portion computation could probably be challenged if the
taxpayer could show circumstances such as (1) provisions in the gov-
erning instrument limiting the investment to particular classes of prop-
erty on which the return has been substantially more or less than the
rate suggested in the Regulation ;53 (2) past history of the property held
in fact, even though the instrument does not require it to be held ;54 (3)
the record as a whole, including the speculative nature of the invest-
ment.55
In a situation where it was necessary to value the life estate which
preceded a charitable remainder, the Tax Court concluded 6 that the
computation should be based on the actual yield of the estate (rather
than the tables provided by the Regulations) and the physical condition
of the life beneficiary (rather than her actuarial expectancy). The
"yield" was defined as the percentage of return on the investment. This
was computed on the basis of the dividends actually paid and the
market price at the date of the decedent's death (rather than the par
value of the stock at that time)." The formula used was:
Rate of return on investment = dividends actually paid
market price
The yield (or rate of return) was, in fact, somewhat less than 32 %,
but this figure was used for convenience of computation. The govern-
ment's contention that the 4% rate of the Regulations should be used
was overruled. This method of computation of a rate return may be
useful in computing the marital deduction specific portion. It is arguably
prima facie reasonable since it was adopted by the Tax Court. It would
appear to offer something of a precedent on which original computations
or challenges to existing rates could be based. Although it may be limited
to situations where stock is involved, it would appear to be useful in
those circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A marital deduction for a "specific portion" of a trust is available
when the surviving spouse is entitled to a set amount of income for life.5
Such specific portion can apparently be computed in either of two ways,
but the simplest method seems to be to divide the stipend to be produced
F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1945) ; Huntington Nat'l. Bank v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 13 T.C. 760 (1949).53 Havley v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. C1. 1945).
54 Estate of Irma Green v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 T.C. 728
(1954).
55 Estate of Milton Sills, 35 B.T.A. 815 (1937).561Huntington Nat'l. Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 T.C. 760
(1949).
5 Id. at 771.58 Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S.
213 (1967).
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by the rate of return reasonably to be expected. This method has been
followed in fact by the Seventh Circuit. 59
The problem of determining what is a reasonable rate of return may
be subject to further difficulty. It is likely that a Treasury Regulation
will be promulgated establishing the rate to be used. However, if it is
not, there seems to be other methods available by which it can be deter-
mined. One court has determined a reasonable rate of return by refer-
ence to the rate used in annuity valuation tables in the Treasury
Regulations.6" Another has determined the rate of return on the basis
of the market price of the stock involved and the dividends in fact paid
by such stock. 61 Still other courts have refused to accept Treasury Regu-
lation determination of a general rate of return to be used, when the
facts of the particular case indicate a far different rate was in fact earned
or to be expected.62 In one case, where the governing instrument re-
stricted the types of investments to be made, the court seemed to find
something akin to a restriction on the amount of income to be p o-
duced ;63 this suggests that an instrument governing a marital deduction
trust might require investment at a given rate of return and that this
requirement might be the reasonable rate of return on which to base
the computation of the deduction. This suggestion, however, may run
afoul of the statement by the Supreme Court in Northeastern that a
reasonable rate of return presupposed lack of restrictions on the in-
vestments.14
The availability of a specific portion marital deduction for a set sum
of income does not necessarily imply that the power to appoint a set
sum of the corpus will also qualify for the deduction. Factually, this
situation has not been before the Supreme Court. Although the legislative
history is not conclusive on this question, and indeed did not even deal
with such a fact situation, the Supreme Court did say in Northeastern
that "specific portion" did not per se require that the spouse share with
the government the risk of fluctuation in value. 65 However, the Court, in
another case, has also emphatically stated that the martial deduction
was not intended to allow tax free transfers of wealth to succeeding
generations.6 There is nothing in the facts of Northeastern to suggest
that the Court is reversing this prior position; there is language which
'9 Citizens Nat'l. Bank of Evansville v. United States, 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.
1966).
60 Ibid. See Treas. Regs. §20.2031-7 (1961).
61 Huntington Nat'l. Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 T.C. 760
(1949).
2 Estate of Milton Sills, 35 B.T.A. 815 (1937) ; Havley v. United States, 63
F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
63 Havley v. United States, supra note 62.
64 Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387
U.S. 213, 224 (1967).
65 Id. at 222.
66 Stapf v. United States, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963).
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strongly indicates that the Court is not deciding this question at this
time.8 7 Considering the necessity of long-range planning in this area
of the law, it would perhaps be wiser not to rely on the "tax advantage"
suggested by the dissenters in Northeastern; they may prove to be
right, and the power to appoint a specific sum also may satisfy the
"specific portion" requirements, but this is neither necessarily nor con-
clusively established either by legislative history, by the statutes them-
selves, or by prior judicial interpretation.
JOAN KESSLER
67Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States 387
U.S. 213, 224-225 (1967).
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